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Abstract 
 
Understanding cooperation among authoritarian regimes remains a puzzle for researchers; in 
particular, those working in post-Soviet Eurasia. Research suggests that autocrats are becoming 
increasingly coordinated in their efforts to thwart democracy, with authoritarian-led regional 
organizations offering an effective vehicle to extend autocrat time horizons. In contrast, older 
studies, including insights from failed regional integration among former Soviet states, suggest that 
the absence of democracy limits cooperation, although in both cases there is a lack of detail on the 
mechanisms enabling or constraining relations between autocrats. This article addresses this 
shortcoming by developing a theoretical framework based around autocrat survivability or “regime 
security” and applying it to the important case of the newly formed Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU), drawing on original interview data with experts and stake-holders in Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Russia. The argument forwarded in this article is that concerns over regime security create 
antagonistic cooperation drivers. In the case of the EAEU, regime security provides a strong 
explanation for the inability of member states to coordinate policy. The implication is that future 
studies should pay close attention to the way the material and ideational aspects of authoritarian rule 
combine to drive, but also limit relations between autocrats. 
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Introduction 
 
Research on the international dimensions of authoritarian rule suggests that autocrats are becoming 
increasingly coordinated in their efforts to thwart democracy, and that authoritarian-led regional 
organisations offer an effective vehicle to bolster non-democracies and extend autocrat time- 
horizons (Ambrosio 2009; Bader et al. 2010; Borzel et al. 2013; Libman 2015; Silitski 2010; 
Tansey 2016; Von Soest 2015). With the fragile status of democracy in many parts of the world, 
authoritarian cooperation has the potential to alter the political balance and to create a zone of 
illiberal states united in mutually reinforcing institutions. 
Indeed, authoritarian cooperation is not static, but appears increasingly ambitious, in particular in 
the post-Soviet space. The literature has already noted the expanding remit of the Russia-China led 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which has grown to include election monitoring and 
formal cooperation with other regional organisations (Ambrosio 2009, 182). But of potentially 
greater significance is the creation of a qualitatively new kind of authoritarian integration project in 
the form of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). 
This important regional organisation was established in 2015 and represents an alternative to the 
EU, but in a de-politicised institutional framework, offering current and prospective members a path 
to economic modernisation without democratic conditionality. Hailed by its founders as a means to 
achieve deep integration in a short period of time and to change the geopolitical configuration of the 
continent (Putin 2011), the EAEU has already raised concerns in some quarters of a ‘re- 
Sovietisation’ of the region (FT 2012). With what we know about the geographical limits of 
democratic diffusion (Kopstein and Reilly 2000) and with the backdrop of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis and the EU’s internal problems, the EAEU may well find opportunities to expand 
its influence. To an extent, this is already happening. The EAEU incorporated Kyrgyzstan and 
Armenia as new members in 2015 in regions (Central Asia and the South Caucasus) where the EU’s 
influence is under pressure. 
However, while recent studies suggest that authoritarian regimes are becoming increasingly 
integrated, older studies, including insights from failed integration among former Soviet states 
present a conflicting image of authoritarian cooperation, suggesting that the absence of democracy 
acts as a significant centrifugal force (Allison 2008; Bohr 2004; Collins 2009; Haas 1966). Rather 
than facilitate cooperation, similar authoritarian political systems act as a barrier, supported by the 
poor results of post-Soviet regional integration since 1991 (Kobrinskaya 2007; Olcott, Åslund and 
Garnett 1999; Vinokurov and Libman 2012). 
In fact, the EAEU, despite its relative novelty, appears to reflect this puzzle, with scholars unsure if 
the EAEU is seeking EU-style ‘deep integration’ or something more modest and in line with the 
general experience of post-Soviet integration (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012, 220). In short, there 
appear to be conflicting images of authoritarian cooperation – one where autocrats are increasingly 
coordinated and united in their dealings with each other, and one where authoritarian regimes are 
greatly restricted in their capacity for international cooperation. Clearly, these images are of great 
significance for both regional and international politics, in particular in the context of democratic 
roll-back in post-Soviet Eurasia and other regions. But, as discussed in this article, part of problem 
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lies in the fragmented and implicit treatment of the dynamics of authoritarian cooperation in 
existing studies. 
This article addresses this shortcoming by revisiting the extant regime studies and regionalism 
literature to elaborate a framework to explain authoritarian cooperation, based on the importance of 
autocrat survivability or ‘regime security’, in contrast to mainstream theories emphasising state 
survival and state security, and which includes both material and ideational components. The 
remainder of this article then applies this framework to the case of the EAEU, utilising primary and 
secondary sources as well as original qualitative data from fieldwork conducted in Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia in 2014 and Russia in 2016. This fieldwork included semi-structured 
interviews with thirty stakeholders, policy makers and experts in these three founding member 
states, including representatives from foreign and economic ministries and the nascent Eurasian 
Economic Commission – the supranational component of the EAEU (Appendix 1), offering a 
unique opportunity to explore the dynamics of authoritarian cooperation from the perspective of 
those states involved. 
This article proceeds as follows. The first two parts outline the puzzle of authoritarian cooperation 
and develop the regime security framework. The remainder of this article then applies this 
framework to consider the case of the EAEU, first in terms of regime security as a driver for 
cooperation and then as a brake, inhibiting cooperation. The final section considers the way regime 
security and regime identity combine to limit deeper cooperation, in particular sovereignty pooling. 
The argument forwarded in this article is that concerns over regime security create antagonistic 
drivers for cooperation. In the case of the EAEU, regime security offers some explanation for 
cooperation between member states, while providing a stronger explanation for their inability to 
coordinate policy. The implication is that future studies should pay close attention to the way the 
material and ideational aspects of authoritarian rule combine to drive, but also limit relations 
between autocrats. 
The puzzle of authoritarian cooperation 
 
Coinciding with the perceived retreat of global democracy, scholars have turned their attention to 
the international dimensions of authoritarian rule, including authoritarian cooperation, in an attempt 
to better understand this emerging trend. Although undertheorized (Von Soest 2015, 628) with 
research said to be in its early stages of development (Tansey 2016, 201), existing studies suggest 
that authoritarian regimes are becoming increasingly coordinated in pursuit of a common agenda 
that includes the establishment of regional orders and the replacement of democratic norms with 
their own non-democratic values (Ambrosio 24, 2009). Some scholars have even hypothesised an 
emerging ‘authoritarian international’, united in a common objective of thwarting unwelcome 
international influences, notably the spread of democracy (Silitski 2010, 341). Although evidence is 
far from conclusive, the appearance of relatively dynamic authoritarian-led regional organisations, 
such as the SCO and EAEU, supports the notion that authoritarian cooperation is evolving, if not 
deepening. 
According to this literature, regional organisations potentially represent a significant ‘next step’ in 
authoritarian cooperation, offering an effective means to stabilise and bolster autocrats with the 
potential to create an expanding zone of illiberal coordination. Libman (2015), for example, 
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theorises a number of regime-boosting functions performed by authoritarian-led regional 
organisations, including legitimacy provision, economic support, governance transfer, mutual 
learning and the socialisation/financial support of private business interests. Tansey (2016, 68) 
highlights the importance authoritarian sponsorship via regional organisations, including money and 
weapon transfers and diplomatic support. At the micro level, it has even been suggested that the 
freedom of movement associated with regional integration may help autocrats redirect opponents 
away from activism in their home country toward politically or economically motivated migration 
(Obydenkova and Libman 2015, 21). 
Overall, this increasingly complex authoritarian cooperation has a ‘common sense’ logic. It has 
long been noted by first wave integration scholars that shared values and beliefs facilitate regional 
integration (Nye 1968, 423), while more recent literature has also indicated that autocrats prefer 
cooperating with other autocrats in ‘similar systems’ (Bader et al. 2010, 96). In the case of post- 
Soviet Eurasia, there are no shortage of commonalities that may be expected to drive cooperation 
among authoritarian regimes, some of which are noted in existing studies (Lane 2015, 14; Libman 
and Vinokurov 2012, 14). Beyond authoritarianism, these commonalities include similar economic 
systems (relatively high-levels of state intervention and a high importance of hydrocarbons), high 
levels of economic interdependence, similar security and modernisation concerns, but also a range 
of cultural, historical and linguistic features, (notably the prevalence of Russian language) that go 
some way to explaining the close alignment among certain post-Soviet states following the collapse 
of the USSR. 
However, the relatively recent interest in the dynamics of authoritarian cooperation and its potential 
to re-define regions stands at odds with existing research detailing the problems of cooperation, 
including integration, in the post-Soviet space. While it is not inconceivable that autocrats in the 
region have gradually grown more united in their opposition to a single issue (e.g. the spread of 
democracy) or that some galvanising event has focused states on the need for deeper cooperation 
(e.g. the Global Financial Crisis), when viewed from the perspective of previous studies this 
apparent increase in authoritarian coordination is puzzling. 
The literature detailing post-Soviet regionalism is illustrative of this point. Between 1991 and 2010, 
36 regional organisations were established in the post-Soviet space making it one of the most active 
regions in the world in terms of integration (Keukeleire and Petrova 2016, 270). While the 
participating states were not always clear-cut autocracies, the turn-over of regional organisations 
combined with the prevalence of non-democratic regimes in the region points to a significant 
coordination problem. In fact, scholars have resorted to ‘adjective regionalism’ to capture this 
reality, characterising integration as ‘ink-on-paper’ (Vinokurov and Libman 2012, 53) ‘stalled’ 
(Collins 2009, 254) or ‘virtual’ (Allison 2008, 185), pointing to a circumstance where high-level 
statements of intent are rarely matched by corresponding levels of commitment. 
At a generalised level, a number of explanations have been forwarded to explain these poor results, 
such as the fear of economic and military asymmetry that exits between Russia and all other post- 
Soviet states (Libman and Vinokurov 2012, 192), elite preoccupation with defending sovereignty 
(Olcott, Åslund and Garnett 1999, 22-28) and a general predilection to ignore sovereignty pooling 
commitments and to by-pass the rules (Kobrinskaya 2007, 14-15). However, in many cases the 
5  
prevalence of non-democratic regimes was also viewed as a significant barrier to effective 
cooperation (Allison 2008; Bohr 2004; Collins 2009), notably in the way that national interests are 
subordinated to the interests of the ruling group. This chimes with the work of early integration 
scholars, who noted the importance of democracy as a pre-requisite for successful integration, 
highlighting the difficulty of authoritarian regimes in meeting their integration commitments (Haas 
1966, 106). 
From this perspective, the puzzle of authoritarian cooperation is that similarity, in particular similar 
political systems, is theorised as both a push and pull factor in relations between autocrats. While 
these conflicting images of authoritarian cooperation are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the 
puzzle is magnified by the absence of a clear framework that can serve as an entry point to better 
identify the drivers behind these processes and how they work. 
The framework: Regime security as a key variable in authoritarian cooperation 
 
The approach taken in this article is to reconcile these competing images by revisiting the regime 
studies and regionalism literature in order to find common ground between regime type and 
cooperation drivers. As discussed below, the desire of autocrats to retain power makes concerns 
over regime security a key variable for understanding authoritarian cooperation – a point that is 
often implicit and fragmented in existing literature. Regime security is defined as ‘the condition 
where governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule’ (Jackson 2013, 162) and 
stands in contrast to mainstream theories that emphasise state security/survival as a foreign policy 
driver (see below). For the purposes of this article, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their 
behaviour, through a process of policy coordination, so that partners view them as facilitating the 
realization of their own objectives (Keohane 2005, 50-51). 
Despite the recent focus on the democracy-thwarting potential of authoritarian cooperation, existing 
literature gives a strong hint that regime security is an underlying motivation. There is an 
acknowledgment, for example, that the ultimate goal of autocrats is to extend time horizons or to 
ensure what Ambrosio terms ‘regime survivability’ (2009, 19). As Von Soest notes; regimes 
collaborate when faced with an existential threat (2015, 624), and it is the threat to regime survival 
more than any other that drives authoritarian foreign policies, in particular in the post-Soviet space 
(White and Feklyunina 2014, 239). Overall, cooperation is seen as a logical security strategy in the 
sense that ‘isolated regimes are vulnerable’ and that authoritarian leaders who sit back and watch 
allies ‘founder’, magnify threats to their own rule (Whitehead 2014, 9). 
As detailed in the case of the EAEU, authoritarian cooperation designed to bolster regime security 
does not necessarily take the form of collective security or defence organisations, although this 
sometimes is the case. We know from comparative experience that economic cooperation among 
autocrats often carries a distinct security aspect. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for example, 
was formed as a vehicle for economic and security cooperation in response to the dual threats of the 
USSR and Iran (Walt 1987, 270), but also internal dissent and internal pressures (Priess 1996). But, 
this is by no means an indication of ‘authoritarian exceptionalism’. State security has long been 
theorised as a central foreign policy driver (Waltz 1979) and an important component of economic 
integration per se (Buzan 2003), including European economic integration (Moravcsik 1998, 5-6), 
although for authoritarian leaders, survival becomes a first-order interest to which all others are 
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subordinate – a point supported in post-Soviet area studies literature (Allison 2004, 469; Collins 
2009, 251; Miller and Toritsyn 2005, 332). 
Regime security as a brake on cooperation 
 
In sum, the hypothesis that regime security drives authoritarian cooperation is both testable and 
derived from existing literature and provides an entry point to better understand relations between 
authoritarian regimes. However, a corollary of this is that cooperation that is deemed to endanger 
regime security is likely to be avoided or curtailed by the autocrats in question. Again, existing 
regime studies and regionalism literature support this assertion, although again it is fragmented and 
often implicit. 
For example, from what we know of the ability of intergovernmental organisations to promote 
democracy, there are obvious reasons why autocrats may be reluctant to deepen interdependence 
with other states through authoritarian-led equivalents. International organisations are seen to be 
effective democracy promoters because they provide increased leverage over the domestic affairs of 
member states, opening the way for targeted sanctions, if a member strays from the collective 
norms of that organisation. Sanctions such as de-legitimization through diplomatic pressure, 
economic sanctions and even the negative conditionality of expulsion from the organisation are 
powerful mechanisms to affect domestic political outcomes (Pevehouse 2002, 522). Some scholars 
have already asked if autocrats prefer weaker forms of cooperation (Von Soest 2015, 633) 
presumably in acknowledgement of this point. 
As a result, and under certain circumstances, cooperation may enhance but also weaken regime 
security. Cooperation may gain autocrats powerful patrons able to provide security guarantees and 
bolster incumbents, vis-à-vis domestic and international opposition – as the regime studies literature 
suggests. But, cooperation may afford the same partner states an undesirable level of influence over 
domestic affairs, which may undermine key pillars of regime control and stability. Even without the 
threat of direct interference, cooperation commitments that involve sustained policy coordination 
may require significant changes to existing socio-economic relations within and between states, 
which may directly challenge the ruling group. 
This point, on the delicate multi-balancing that autocrats must engage in is a little ambiguous in 
existing studies. Tansey, for example, mentions that for autocrats to stay in power, they must 
consider the balance of international pressure and support bearing on them, to maximise the latter 
and minimise the former (Tansey 2016, 4). But for any regime, the option of maximising 
international support, in particular through deeper forms of cooperation, must be weighed against 
domestic pressures. Close cooperation with other states may accrue direct material benefits for the 
ruling group, but unsettle the delicate balance among domestic constituencies. 
This suggests the presence of tipping points, based around the balance between the internal and 
external aspects of regime security and which potentially limit the extent of authoritarian 
cooperation. This, in many ways, is unsurprising. Existing literature has long emphasised the way 
that foreign policy in democratic states, including the decision to cooperate with other states, is an 
outcome of bargaining between domestic groups and the economic costs and benefits they 
anticipate. Frameworks which combine domestic and international-level factors to explain foreign 
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policy decisions, such as Putnam’s dual-level game (Putnam 1988) or more sophisticated versions 
(Milner 1997) usefully capture the tension between domestic constituencies. The limited pluralism 
found in most authoritarian regimes reduces scope for bargaining, but concerns over regime security 
mean that autocrats must consider the domestic impact of their international cooperation. 
Regime security and regime identity 
 
This leads to the final point that the nature of regime security, depends in no small part on the 
characteristics of the regime in question. The authoritarian regime-type is hardly a residual 
category, and existing literature has long highlighted variations between authoritarian regimes, 
notably their differing institutions and locales of power (Huntington and Moore 1970; Geddes 
2003). However, alongside these aforementioned material variations, careful attention needs to be 
given to ideational differences in order to avoid a narrow materialist ontology that may limit our 
understanding of authoritarian cooperation. 
The literature on regional integration is quite illustrative. We know, for example, that the degree of 
commitment democratic states are able to make to each other depends on the compatibility of 
internal and external norms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The new regionalism literature 
has also highlighted the importance of identity for integration processes (Soderbaum and Shaw 
2003), including ‘Othering’ (Nuemann 2003), while theorists have made an explicit connection 
between identities, institutions and democratic regime stability. Moravcsik, for example, notes that 
social actors provide support to government in return for institutions that accord with their ‘identity- 
based preferences’, institutions which then become ‘legitimate’ in their eyes (Moravcsik 1997, 525). 
In terms of authoritarian regimes and in particular for the post-Soviet space, there have been 
attempts to highlight the role of identity in explaining foreign policy alignment (Ambrosio 2006), 
balancing behaviour (Gvalia et al. 2013) and the failure of Central Asian regionalism (Rosset and 
Svarin 2014). Elsewhere, literature has highlighted the role of national consciousness as an 
influence on integration (Hale 2008, 191) and the general ability of identity politics to ‘trump’ 
material factors when it comes to foreign policy (White and Feklyunina 2014, 238). 
While the emerging literature on authoritarian cooperation has acknowledged that authoritarian 
regimes do not share a ‘common identity’ (Von Soest 2015, 626), there are grounds to go one step 
further and state that authoritarian regimes have unique identities, which are often cultivated as a 
component of the ruling group’s legitimacy. This identity may take a number of forms, notably 
ethnonational, but it is none the less an important non-material aspect of regime security that 
incumbents must take into account when choosing international partners and in deciding the degree 
of commitment they make. There is some evidence that autocrats may forfeit a materially 
advantageous alignment with a foreign partner because of domestic opposition and the perceived 
threat to identity-based legitimacy (Ehteshami et al. 2013, 227), meaning autocrats must not only 
balance internal and external pressures but also material and ideational threats. 
In this way, regime legitimacy is a function not only of regime performance (e.g. the ability to 
provide security to citizens, economic prosperity, etc. Miller 2006, 26-29.), but also the ability of 
incumbents to safeguard particular values, a way of life or set of relations between society and the 
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state. As regime identity is defined by the ruling group, but also contested (other voices and 
identities exist, but are often repressed), any international cooperation that generates sustained 
contradictions to the regime’s identity, risks encouraging and enabling challengers to ‘outflank’ 
incumbents with broad-based appeals for political change. This is particularly important in electoral 
authoritarian regimes. As most authoritarian regimes invest in a nominal ‘democratic identity’, 
elections are important events, but so too the ability of the ruling group to appeal to a core 
electorate and, if needed, mobilise pro-regime counter-protests. Both are a function of the material 
but also ideational capacity of incumbents. 
In sum, the consideration of complex inter and intra regime balancing and ideational and material 
security provides a multi-level, multi-factorial framework to explore the dynamics of cooperation 
among autocrats. The next sections develop these ideas further through and examination of the 
EAEU, where evidence suggests that concerns over regime security do indeed create antagonistic 
drivers, facilitating but also inhibiting policy coordination. 
The case of Eurasian Economic integration 
 
The EAEU was formally signed into existence by the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in 
January 2015 and joined shortly afterwards by Armenia (January 2015) and Kyrgyzstan (August 
2015). It builds on an older idea of creating a customs union among newly independent states 
(Vinokurov 2007, 26) that found expression in the CIS Customs Union (1993), the Eurasian 
Economic Community (2000), Eurasian Customs Union (2010) and Single Economic Space (2012). 
Despite a bright start that saw trade volumes between Custom Union members increase in 
2011/2012, the combination of sanctions and counter sanctions surrounding the ongoing Ukraine 
crisis and drop in oil prices has seen a consistent decrease in mutual trade, 2013-2016. Total exports 
(millions, USD) by EAEU member states to EAEU partners declined from a high of 67,856 in 2012 
to 42,536 in 2016 (Eurasian Commission 2017). 
In terms of suitability, the EAEU has high value as a case study of authoritarian cooperation. First, 
the EAEU is a good example of an authoritarian-led regional organisation. The EAEU founding 
members (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) are clear non-democracies (‘not free’) with little to 
suggest they are marginal cases (Freedom House 2016) – despite attempts by ruling groups in each 
to sustain a façade of democracy. Second, the fact that the EAEU is an economic and not a security 
organisation provides an ideal opportunity to test the claim that regime security drives cooperation 
between autocratic states. Finally, the EAEU is an important case because of its implications for the 
region, but also the way it continues to draw divergent accounts from the literature, in particular if 
the EAEU is seeking EU-style deep integration or something more modest (Dragneva and Wolczuk 
2012). As such, this article is able to contribute to this debate by exploring EAEU drivers and their 
strength and direction. 
The following discussion draws on primary and secondary sources, as well as in-depth interviews 
conducted in 2014 just before the official unveiling of the EAEU, with follow up interviews 
conducted in 2016 (Appendix 1). Each interview focused on the motivations and perspectives of 
integration as seen by experts and stake-holders in each state. Overall, the choice of interviews is 
well-suited for this research, offering insider-views from the three founding member states and a 
unique opportunity to explore the dynamics of authoritarian cooperation from the perspective of 
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those states involved. For ethical reasons interviewees are anonymised and cited by country 
(Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) or institutions (Eurasian Economic Commission) only. 
Regime security as a driver for cooperation? 
 
From the outset, the appearance and development of the EAEU has been accompanied by an 
obvious economic logic, meaning that, in the official discourse, economic rather than security 
factors present themselves as ‘first order’ drivers. With the inclusion of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in 
2015, the EAEU comprises a huge market of over 170 million people with a combined GDP of 
more than 2 trillion USD, creating substantial opportunities for domestic producers and for 
attracting foreign investment. With an explicit aim of realising the four economic freedoms and of 
coordinating economic policy among member states, the EAEU offers a long list of advantages for 
member states. 
For Belarus and Kazakhstan, unfettered access to the huge Russian market offers immediate 
benefits, not least the opportunity to modernise their respective economies, without the risk of full 
exposure to the globalised economy. Companies in Belarus and Kazakhstan have the opportunity to 
become part of the Russian production chain and to benefit from Russian investment, as well as 
external investment from non-member states wishing to access the common market. For Russia, 
improved access to markets in Belarus and Kazakhstan (nine million and 17 million people 
respectively) is not insignificant, in particular for key manufacturing sectors, such as the automotive 
industry. Business also has the opportunity to relocate to member states to take advantage of 
differing tax regimes, if and when issues with residency are resolved. 
In addition, and at a macro level, there is also an underlying assumption in each member state that 
the global economy is ‘evolving in the direction of regional economic blocks and alliances’ and that 
the next stage of development will likely see the creation of transregional alliances, like the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement (T-IPP) (Interview, Russia, 2014). As 
such, there is a consensus that the Eurasian region risks being left behind, if it continues to hesitate 
with its own integration projects. In fact, it is here at the macro level that we also find evidence that 
integration has a more tangible regime security component alongside the obvious economic drivers. 
The first indication that the EAEU is a reaction to a perceived threat to regime security is seen in 
the form of the ongoing effects of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. These effects were quick to 
materialise in the region, seen in Russia’s economic slump in 2009 and the financial crisis in 
Belarus in 2011, but also in the longer-term drop in the price of oil – a key cog in the political 
economy of post-Soviet authoritarianism. Falling demand for oil without a corresponding drop in 
production has seen oil prices decline by two thirds in the period 2008-2016, affecting Russia and 
Kazakhstan as major oil exporters but also Belarus, whose economy derives significant revenue 
from refining oil. The removal of tariffs and a commitment to create common access to pipeline 
infrastructure are part of an attempt to mitigate the reliance that each member state has on 
international commodity markets. 
In addition, the economic slowdown that followed the 2008 Financial Crisis refocused regional 
leaders on the need to diversify their economies (Putin 2014a), with the removal of tariffs seen as an 
important step in stimulating other sectors of the economy and raising competitiveness in a region 
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that lags behind others on most comparative measures. As such, the on-going effects of the 2008 
financial crisis have led to an understanding that cooperation is essential or as one interviewee 
remarked: ‘keeping together gives us added value’ (Interview, Russia, 2014). In this sense, the 
EAEU serves as a vehicle for economic modernisation among states with similar levels of 
development. 
In fact, this idea of economic vulnerability ties into the second threat to regime security that 
underpins Eurasian economic integration – the growing influence of the ‘democratic’ European 
Union (EU), but also ‘authoritarian’ China in the region. In many ways, this is unsurprising, as 
customs unions are designed to create but also divert trade (Mattli 1999, 11) and without trade 
diversion the presence of two huge economies on the western and eastern flanks poses a longer- 
term threat to the security of ruling groups in the region. Even though the economies of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia benefited from rising oil prices and a general economic upturn, 2000-2008, 
the expansion of EU and Chinese economies is hard to ignore. In the period 1991 up the creation of 
the EAEU in 2015, the EU’s GDP grew from 7.8 to 16.3 trillion USD, while China’s GDP 
increased from 3.8 billion USD to 11 trillion USD (World Bank EU; World Bank China 2017) – in 
both cases dwarfing the 2 trillion USD combined GDP EAEU member states. 
For Belarus and Russia, the implications of Chinese investment and the growing trade-imbalance 
have yet to receive public attention, but it is Kazakhstan where a growing nationalist sentiment 
combines with a fear of China (Interview, Kazakhstan, 2014) and where the nature of Kazakhstan- 
China relations are openly discussed in public. Here, the economic threat posed by China is seen in 
terms of cheap goods undercutting domestic producers, but also the unease felt in some quarters at 
growing Chinese influence in the country. As such, the EAEU is viewed as a necessary step to 
shield Kazakhstan from China’s presence in the region. 
Like China, the EU is also viewed as an economic threat, but here the boundary between economics 
and politics becomes blurred. For some, the new generation of Association Agreements drafted by 
the EU in 2009 served as a direct stimulus for Eurasian economic integration, as Russia along with 
other states in the region were forced to respond (Adomeit 2012). This corresponds to a general 
understanding in Moscow at least, that if Russia is not pushing a cooperation agenda in the region, 
then others will fill the vacuum: ‘if Russia is not actively promoting this concept [integration], then 
neighbouring countries will get engaged in other integration projects’ (Interview, Russia, 2014). 
More importantly, there is also a belief among member states that the EU is heavily politicised, 
meaning that political expansion accompanies economic expansion – something viewed as 
intrinsically threatening. This links to the third regime security threat that the EAEU is designed to 
counter – externally provoked regime change or a Ukrainian-style ‘Maidan’ uprising, spreading as a 
contagion to neighbouring states, either through a spontaneous demonstration effect or directed by 
hostile third parties. 
In both Russia and Belarus, notions of a fifth column are frequently articulated by the regime. In 
Russia, this is a fully fledged public discourse focused on the entire spectrum of regime opponents 
(Lipman 2015), while in Belarus the Polish minority has been targeted, in particular following the 
introduction of a Polish Ethnicity Card for citizens of the former USSR in 2007 (BTI 2014, 5). 
Kazakhstan also has significant issues with domestic opposition, at times drawing direct criticism 
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from the EU (Savchenko 2015) and exacerbated by ongoing concerns surrounding political stability 
and leadership succession. The EAEU provides an opportunity to stabilise regimes through gradual 
economic development, as well as offering the prospect of collective action and external assistance 
from partners, if and when needed. 
In this sense, there is some evidence that the role of the EAEU is to complement other security- 
focused integration projects to resist the spread of colour revolution. In June 2012, Belarus leader 
Aleksandr Lukashenko met with Vladimir Putin to discuss the threat of sanctions and western 
sponsored regime change (Lukashenko 2012). Belarus, like Russia, is no stranger to EU economic 
sanctions. Following a brief period of détente with the West that saw Belarus sign up to the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership in 2009, the EU imposed rolling sanctions in the wake of Lukashenko’s 
December 2010 presidential election victory and an accompanying crackdown on regime opposition 
figures (Benzow 2011). The EAEU, alongside other structures, such as the Belarus-Russia Union 
State Treaty and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides an extra layer of support, 
including financial assistance, in circumstances when other sources of credit may become 
unavailable. In this regard, the EAEU is an important source of regime credit, acting through the 
financial mechanisms of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the Eurasian Stabilisation and 
Development Fund (ESDF). Since its creation in 2006, the EDB has invested around USD 4.85 
billion in the region, while the ESDF, with capital of USD 8.5 billion, acts a regional IMF and a 
‘lender of last resort’ (Vinokurov 2017, 58) 
In addition, membership of the EAEU increases the prospects of direct support from Russia, both in 
terms of hard security guarantees but also direct economic support. Again, Belarus is illustrative of 
the economic benefit of closely aligning with Russia, not only through Moscow-approved bail-outs 
from the EDB in 2011, but also energy subsidies. Following a deal with Russia in 2014, Belarus 
pays no export duties on the oil it imports from Russia, refines and then sells on international 
markets (Interfax 2014) and overall it is estimated that Russian subsidies account for up to 20 per 
cent of Belarus’s GDP, with half of all that country’s exports going to Russia (Bentzen and Dietrich 
2016). As one interviewee noted: ‘Eurasian integration carries with it opportunities for us to keep 
on getting energy subsidies and rebates from Russia’ (Interview, Belarus, 2014). This tallies with 
other studies of the EAEU that emphasise the importance of ‘extractive relations’ and the ability of 
ruling elites to continue to concentrate power and resources in their own hands (Ter-Matevosyan et 
al. 2017, 350). 
Regime security as a brake on cooperation? 
 
In the case of the EAEU there is no shortage of evidence of coordination problems between 
members-states, although these problems are in some ways exacerbated by international conditions. 
This is particularly evident in terms of foreign policy coordination against the backdrop of the 
Ukraine crisis and Russia’s unilateral counter sanctions introduced in August 2014, which have 
proved a point of contention for both Belarus and Kazakhstan. In fact, the unwillingness of other 
EAEU member states to support Russian sanctions against Ukraine in itself shows the very real 
limits of authoritarian cooperation. 
Elsewhere, the relatively high-number of coordination problems seen in the period 2015-2016 do 
not necessarily reflect deep-seated regime security issues, but general problems of trust-building 
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familiar to most regional integration projects. In particular, the use of non-tariff barriers remains a 
problem, with each member state accusing partners of selectively applying them to protect domestic 
producers from competition. 
For just one member state – Kazakhstan – the period 2015-2016 witnessed numerous trade 
disruptions with EAEU partners. In 2015 and 2016, Kazakhstan temporarily banned Russian food 
imports, citing health concerns and the need to protect consumers from poor quality products 
(Mgov.Kz 2016). In March 2015, Kazakhstan imposed a 45-day ban on Russian oil imports to 
protect domestic producers and in May 2015 the government approved new standards limiting the 
import of Russian and Belarussian vehicles (Rodeheffer 2015). This comes against a backdrop of 
currency devaluation and persistent accusations that member states are trying to boost the 
competitiveness of domestic producers. 
In most cases, the numerous disputes among EAEU members in the period, 2015-2017, and 
following the official unveiling of the EAEU, reflect the weakness of institutions and by extension 
the Union’s enforcement mechanisms. The supranational component of the EAEU – the Eurasian 
Economic Commission – has little power to influence domestic institutions, beyond urging 
compliance with regulations. In 2017, for example, the Commission acknowledged its inability to 
intervene in the so-called ‘meat war’ between Belarus and Russia and to force the Russian food 
inspection agency to remove punitive measure on Belarussian meat (Wolczuk and Dragneva 2017, 
14). Likewise, the judicial body of the Union – the EAEU court – was deemed an ineffective 
mechanism for settling disputes by legal experts even before the EAEU came online in 2015 
(Checkalov 2014, 12). Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Council, which consists of each head of state, is 
the highest body of the EAEU, meaning member state leaders retain high-levels of ‘manual control’ 
over the integration process as a whole (Roberts and Moshes 2016: 9). 
At a deeper level, the choice of weak institutions and the selective enforcement of integration 
commitments reflect the fact the problematic relationship between regime security and policy 
coordination. For example, while the problem of non-tariff barriers is not unique to the post-Soviet 
space or other regional integration projects, there are deeper fears among EAEU member states that 
too much integration will mobilise domestic opposition and increase the political and economic 
leverage of partner states to an unacceptable level. This is particularly so for Russia’s smaller 
partner states, where leaders understand the advantages of close cooperation with their larger 
neighbour, but also the risks involved. 
Every post-Soviet state has economic relations with Russia and so some degree of interdependence, 
typically asymmetrical. The economies of Belarus and Kazakhstan and new EAEU members 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are reliant on Russian energy and energy providers in various forms, 
including the supply of oil and gas, transit of oil and gas, but also the operation of electricity and 
nuclear power sectors. In addition, most states in the region rely on access to the Russian market, 
not least in the form of worker remittances sent back from Russia. But for both Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, there are specific regime security issues at stake. 
For Belarus, relations with Russia continue to operate on two levels. At an official level, Belarus 
and Russia are the closest-aligned states in the post-Soviet space; an alignment underpinned by the 
1999 bilateral Union State Treaty and joint membership of a host of multilateral regional 
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organisations. However, both states have a long history of coordination problems, including 
numerous oil and gas pricing conflicts and a host of other disagreements both before and after the 
official unveiling of the EAEU in 2015. In 2016, Moscow and Minsk clashed over plans to build a 
Russian airbase in Belarus and over the latter’s introduction of border regulations affecting 
Russians travelling from the Kaliningrad enclave. Although Vladimir Putin identified Belarus as 
Russia’s closest ‘strategic partner’ during a meeting with the Belarus President in July 2015 
(Kremlin 2015) at an unofficial level, Aleksandr Lukashenko is viewed by Russia as a ‘situational 
partner’ – unreliable and willing to support Russian initiatives but only if the price is right. 
However, the ability of the Lukashenko regime to extract concessions from Russia is tempered by 
the fact that the regime’s existing limited leverage will diminish, if the Belarus economy is 
liberalised, as envisaged under the aegis of the EAEU. There is an acknowledgment within Belarus 
that reform is dangerous, not least because Russia is best placed to take advantage. Russia has 
greater bureaucratic resources and expertise than any other member state, which can be used to 
lobby and determine the path of integration. Moreover, it is Russian companies and Russian capital 
that are best poised to take advantage of new openings in neighbouring markets if and when 
liberalising reforms happen. 
In terms of regime security, there is a fear that Russian criminal organisations or the Russian state 
may use economic reforms in Belarus to take a controlling stake in key industries, possibly through 
manipulating shareholders (Interview, Belarus, 2014) and from this position attempt to remove 
Lukashenko and replace him with a more malleable partner. Lukashenko himself has repeatedly 
claimed that Russia is seeking to undermine him, even going so far as to identify Russia as an 
existential threat to Belarus, alongside NATO (Moscow Times 2014). Following yet another gas 
pricing dispute in May 2016, Russian experts did not rule out a Moscow-backed attempt to remove 
Lukashenko in the near future (Hodasevich 2016a). 
In comparison to Belarus, Kazakhstan’s economic reliance on Russia is significantly less, but as 
interviewees noted, similar concerns exist that liberalising reforms will see Russian companies 
over-run domestic competition (Interview, Kazakhstan 2014). Moreover, Russia’s increasing 
unpredictability as a partner is also creating concerns. In economic terms, Moscow’s unilateral 
decision to impose counter-sanctions in 2014 dismayed many within Kazakhstan, as well as figures 
within the Eurasian Economic Commission (Interview, Eurasian Commission, 2016). In foreign 
policy terms, there is concern that Russia is pulling Kazakhstan into an isolationist project, leading 
some to question the motivations behind Russia’s integration drive. As such, Russia’s motives are 
increasingly viewed as geopolitical, in sharp contrast to Astana’s stringent desire for a ‘de- 
politicised economic-only project’ (Interview, Kazakhstan 2014). 
However, a qualitatively different issue for Kazakhstan is Russia’s unpredictable use of force. The 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent emergence of Putin’s ‘Crimea Doctrine’ (Putin 
2014b) and the readiness to intervene beyond the territory of the Russian Federation to defend 
ethnic Russians is a significant development. The combination of a large ethnic Russian population 
in the north of Kazakhstan and uncertainty concerning the post-Nazarbaev power succession opens 
up the possibility of Russian intervention in the future. While rarely mentioned in high-level 
statements within Kazakhstan, this hypothetical situation is acknowledged in Russian circles as a 
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likely source of consternation in Kazakhstan, as well as other neighbouring states (interview, 
Russia, 2014). For some, there is little doubt that any political instability in Kazakhstan that 
threatens Moscow’s interests will be met with military intervention: ‘Russia will use force in 
Kazakhstan as a last resort to restore order’ (Interview, Russia, 2016). 
In addition, for both Belarus and Kazakhstan, there are clear indications that integration must be 
balanced with external security concerns but also internal tensions. In Belarus, attempts by the 
government to enforce EAEU regulations that small traders selling imported goods provide details 
of their origin have already resulted in protests. The so-called edict 222 came into force in January 
2016 and resulted in several localised demonstrations in February and March 2016, with protestors 
and the opposition United Civic Party demanding the government’s dismissal. Although relatively 
small in size (they numbered several hundred), this law may affect up to 120,000 small businesses 
(Marples 2016), but more importantly these protests were explicitly anti-Eurasian Union in nature 
(Hodasevich 2016b) and provide an early indication of the problems of enforcing integration 
commitments. 
In Kazakhstan, moves to amend a law allowing foreign citizens to own land sparked widespread 
protests in April 2016, with tens of thousands taking to the streets. Eventually, Kazakhstan’s 
leadership was forced to introduce a moratorium in August 2016 (RIA Novosti 2016). This comes 
against a backdrop of persistent negative media commentary on the EAEU within Kazakhstan 
(Likhachev 2015) and a growing dissatisfaction among business elites in the country at the poor 
results of integration to date. Throughout 2015 the government came under sustained (and 
successful) pressure from domestic producers to limit Russian imports. The pro-business ‘loyal’ 
opposition party, Ak Zhol, which supports protectionism, has repeatedly cautioned against 
Kazakhstan’s involvement in the EAEU and any temptation to sacrifice the nation’s sovereignty 
and independence. 
Regime identity and Eurasian economic integration 
 
What the cases of Belarus and Kazakhstan show is the delicate balance between the costs and 
benefits of policy coordination in political systems that lack the institutional means to absorb and 
accommodate popular dissatisfaction. In line with the regime security framework, both cases also 
reveal the ideational challenges that authoritarian cooperation poses, in particular sustained policy 
coordination and sovereignty pooling, when the adjustments needed to meet commitments to 
partner states threatens to undermine the regime identity that ruling groups have cultivated over a 
long period of rule. 
In the case of the post-Soviet space, the break-up of the Soviet Union initiated a process of nation 
building in newly independent states, a process in which ruling groups became embedded first as 
initiators and then as defenders of an emerging national identity (Fawn 2004, 20). As such, for 
many post-Soviet states, regime identity is closely entwined with national identity, and with one or 
two notable exceptions (Belarus) this identity is based around ethnicity. In these terms, the 
resilience of many authoritarian regimes in the region is based on the (continuing) support of a core 
ethnic group which confers additional legitimacy on rulers, who promote themselves as ‘defenders’ 
of particularistic group interests. 
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One exception is Belarus. Unlike most post-Soviet states, Belarusian national identity is weakly 
developed, although both Russia and Europe are often cast as significant ‘Others’ (White and 
Feklyunina 2014, 163, 165) with the regime shifting the state’s official discourse between the two. 
In the place of nationalism, long-standing leader Aleksandr Lukashenko has built regime identity 
around a commitment to a socially oriented state, that sees relatively high levels of social welfare 
(albeit low quality) compared to Russia and Kazakhstan (Cook 2007) and relatively high levels of 
state ownership in the economy. 
For Belarus, and for Lukashenko in particular, any economic reform must be gradual in order to 
preserve the regime’s material control over the state, but also the regime’s credentials as a defender 
of a particular way of life that has changed little since 1991. In order for Lukashenko to retain 
power, he must careful coordinate his policies in accordance with the preferences of his core 
electorate and supress market forces. As Zlotnikov notes, it would be difficult for Lukashenko to 
change his negative attitude toward the private sector because it would go against his own 
convictions, but also that of his electoral base (Zlotnikov 2004, 138). 
However, this places Belarus in a paradoxical situation in the context of EAEU and the 
requirements of sustained policy coordination and economic integration. There is an open 
acknowledgement within the country and within the other EAEU member states that the Belarus 
economy lags in terms of levels of economic liberalisation. In 2011, following the Belarus financial 
crisis, loans from the EDB were conditioned on economic reform, including privatisation, but so far 
the Belarus leadership has continued to stall. The government’s social and economic plan for the 
period 2016-2020 promises to ‘modernise property relations’ (Belarus 2016), but is at odds with 
other high-level statements on economic development. Lukashenko’s address to the People’s 
Assembly in July 2016 ruled out any deviation from the established ‘gradualist’ approach to 
modernisation (Lukashenko 2016). Within Belarus there is an opinion that the country will never 
meet all its integration commitments: ‘Belarus will never adopt the economic rules and the 
principles of liberalism which prevail in Russia’ (Interview Belarus 2014). 
In Kazakhstan, under the long-standing leadership of Nursultan Nazarbaev, the regime has built an 
identity around the values of sovereignty and political and economic independence, but 
underpinned by support for ethnic Kazakh nationalism. So, while Nazarbaev has been a consistent 
champion of Eurasian integration as a necessary tool to modernise the country, the regime’s 
ethnonationalism implies a circumscribed limit to the extent of Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia. 
Among the more controversial moves of the regime has made in recent years include a program for 
increasing the number of Kazakh-speakers in the country to 95 per cent by 2025 as well as a plan to 
‘modernise’ the Kazakh alphabet by abandoning the existing Cyrillic in favour of a Latin script 
(Roberts and Moshes 2016, 13). In addition, there are indications that identity is hindering foreign 
policy coordination with Moscow and contributing to ‘civilizational conflicts’, as the regime 
gravitates toward ethnically similar Turkey and Azerbaijan (Galstyan 2017). 
The problem for the ruling group in Kazakhstan is that Eurasian integration is increasingly 
challenging the regime’s identity as a defender of the key values of sovereignty and independence 
as well as the interests of ethnic Kazakhs. While the focus of land reform protests in April 2016 
carried a distinct anti-Chinese character (Solov’eva 2016), there exists a significant anti-Russian 
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sentiment among Kazakh nationalists (Interview, Kazakhstan, 2014). This sentiment could create 
problems for the regime, if integration is perceived to disproportionally benefit Russia – as indeed 
the current media discourse within the country attests. Available opinion-poll data from 2014 just 
prior to the formation of the EAEU showed that ethnic Kazakhs (13.1 per cent) were almost three 
times more likely to oppose integration than ethnic Russians (4.9 per cent) living in Kazakhstan 
(KISI 2014, 47). In terms of regime security, failure to protect the right flank and to defend the 
values of sovereignty and the interests of ethnic Kazakhs, opens opportunities for challengers to 
appropriate the ideological space vacated by the regime as defenders of the nation’s key 
constituencies and values. 
Conclusions 
 
This article contributes to the emerging literature on the international dimensions of authoritarian 
rule, but also the nascent Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The argument forwarded in this 
article is that concerns over regime security create antagonistic cooperation drivers. In the case of 
the EAEU, regime security offers some explanation for cooperation between member states, while 
providing a stronger explanation for their inability to coordinate policy. Rather than united in the 
perception of a common threat, EAEU member states are busy balancing multiple challenges to 
regime security, including those resulting from cooperation with their authoritarian partners. At the 
same time, rather than offer a problem free route to ‘regime upgrading’ or modernisation, ambitious 
cooperation projects, notably those involving economic integration, appear to contain tipping points 
and diminishing regime security returns. Despite the appearance of the ambitious EAEU, this article 
confirms the older regionalism literature that highlighted the poor results of post-Soviet integration 
since 1991. 
In terms of better understanding the dynamics of authoritarian cooperation, there are a number of 
avenues that present themselves. The first is the difficult task of specifying tipping points in 
authoritarian cooperation. A second, related question is the compatibility of authoritarianism with 
any form of economic integration involving liberalising reforms. There is an argument that 
economic liberalism helps produce democracy by separating economic and political power 
(Ulfelder 2008, 274). Economic integration is also assumed to go ‘hand in hand with the 
development of a democratic identity’ (van der Vleuten and Hoffmann 2010, 739). From these 
perspectives, it is questionable if anything but token economic integration is compatible with 
authoritarian resilience. 
A third and potentially more intriguing research avenue relates to authoritarian strategies for 
balancing internal and external pressures within regional organisations. This may involve a closer 
consideration of the malleability of regime identity in the hands of long-serving autocrats and the 
possibility that regimes may develop ‘multiple’ identities to ease integration concerns. Cross- 
regional research would be best suited for observing the range of strategies designed to limit the 
impact of integration commitments while still extracting benefits. As in the case of the EAEU, this 
may include the use of non-tariff barriers, the creation of weak supra-national institutions, and 
general ‘feet-dragging’. Another feature of the EAEU is the prevalence of individual state opt-outs 
and multi-speed integration that typically involve concessions in certain areas (e.g. regarding the 
Union’s expansion) in order to buy time in others. In addition, the whole issue of multi-vectored 
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foreign policies and an emerging discourse surrounding ‘big Eurasia’, including open regionalism, 
in particular in Belarus and Kazakhstan, suggest a mild attempt or strategy of ‘soft balancing’ 
Russia. Examining these strategies and others in the context of regional integration, both in and 
beyond the post-Soviet space, would serve to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of 
authoritarian cooperation. 
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